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During the 1989 term, the Supreme Court issued opinions that rep-
resent dramatic set-backs in many civil rights areas. One area dramati-
cally affected was the constitutionality of affirmative action programs in
the employment arena. In City of Richmond v. JA. Croson,l the Court
held that a Virginia set-aside plan which required thirty percent of all
city-awarded contracts to be completed using minority subcontractors
was invalid under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. This ruling shocked civil rights supporters and sent munic-
ipal governments throughout the nation rushing to evaluate or dismantle
their affirmative action programs.'
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states
that "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."3 This grants the right of all United States
citizens to equal treatment, regardless of factors such as race, religion,
and gender. Equal treatment includes equality of opportunities to par-
ticipate in all the basic privileges of citizenship.4 A legacy of discrimina-
tion has denied minorities equal rights and prevented minorities from
achieving full representation in social institutions. This legacy thwarts
the ideal of equality. Remedying discrimination against minorities re-
mains "one of the most profound moral and constitutional challenges
facing our nation."5 Progress in increased minority representation can
be achieved only through remedial efforts designed to foster minority
1. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
2. Joint Statement, Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of
Richmond v. TA. Croson Co., 98 YALE L.J. 1711, n.* (1989) (hereinafter "Joint Statement").
See Curry, Set-aside Plans May Face Suits, Chicago Tribune January 24, 1989, p. 2C: "The
Supreme Court's rejection of Richmond's affirmative-action program will trigger legal attacks
on minority set-aside programs and threaten voluntary efforts to rectify past discrimina-
tion.... According to [the U.S. Conference of Mayors,] 190 local governments and 36 states
have adopted minority set-aside programs...
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Joint Statement, supra note 2, at 1711.
5. Id
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opportunities.6
Employers and governments have recognized this need and enacted
affirmative action programs to incorporate minority membership into ar-
eas of historical exclusion. These race-conscious plans that favor a his-
torically disadvantaged group have been criticized for resulting in
"reverse-discrimination," ultimately working to the disadvantage of
whites. Critics of affirmative action argue7 that race-based distinctions
violate the mandate that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind." 8
The Supreme Court struggled with the question of racial distinc-
tions in the remedial context for twenty-five years. A majority, however,
could not agree on the appropriate constitutional test to apply to race-
conscious plans.9 The issue remained extremely divisive. Some members
of the Court applied a "strict scrutiny" analysis while others applied a
"near strict scrutiny" analysis. 10 Affirmative action opinions were al-
ways written by pluralities of the Court."
Even under the rigid strict scrutiny approach, the Court would al-
low affirmative action programs in certain circumstances. In a recent
article responding to the Croson decision, constitutional scholars argued
that race-conscious programs "designed to bring excluded groups into
the societal mainstream-to ensure equal citizenship for all Americans-
promote the goals of the equal protection clause and cannot be viewed as
inherently contrary to the Constitution .... ,,12
Croson represents the first case in which a majority of the Court held
that all race-conscious programs will be judged by strict scrutiny. Under
such a standard, the program must promote a compelling governmental
interest by means necessary to promote that interest. 3 In only one case,
now widely discredited, has the governmental interest been sufficiently
compelling to support a racial classification that disadvantaged minority
groups. 4 Under Croson, the strict scrutiny test the Court traditionally
applied to "invidious" discrimination that disadvantages minorities now
6. IM
7. See text accompanying notes 141-151.
8. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
9. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 301 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
10. See text accompanying notes 26-30, 50-53, 58-61, and 81-83.
11. See text accompanying notes 24, 41, and 58.
12. Joint Statement, supra note 2, at 1712.
13. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706, 721 (1989).
14. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Court rejected a Japanese-
American's equal protection challenge to his conviction for violating internment orders issued
under the 1942 Congressional Act confining all Japanese-Americans to detention camps dur-
ing World War II.
applies to "benign""5 discrimination that favors minorities.' 6
This Comment examines the background of the Court's affirmative
action jurisprudence, consisting of the three cases using constitutional
analysis1 7 that preceded the Croson decision: University of California v.
Bakke, 8 Fullilove v. Klutznick,' 9 and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educa-
tion.20 From these decisions to Croson, the Court's view of affirmative
action is analyzed as represented by the individual Justices.
In this important area of equal protection, widespread disagreement
continues among the Justices as to the appropriate role of the Court and
the Constitution in race-conscious remedies. This Comment will ex-
amine the extent to which each Justice stands by the "Constitution is
colorblind"21 mandate or, as Justice Blackmun stated in his Bakke opin-
ion, "In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of
race.... [a]nd in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them
differently."22 This Comment also considers how each Justice finds the
requisite governmental interest to support such programs by examining
the extent to which each Justice requires specific prior instances of dis-
crimination by the governmental entity. Finally, the alternatives and fu-
ture of affirmative action after Croson will be briefly addressed.
I. Background
A. University of California v. Bakke
The celebrated case of University of California v. Bakke,23 involved a
challenge to a medical school affirmative action program. The univer-
sity's program reserved 16 out of 100 seats for minority students.24 In a
plurality opinion, authored by Justice Powell, the Court invalidated the
university's admissions program. The Court was divided, however, on
the correct standard and on the appropriate disposition of the case. Four
members of the majority found the plan violated Title VI of the 1964
Civil Rights Act, and thus did not reach the constitutional question of an
15. University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 356, 361 (1978) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
16. Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 706. 'The standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause
is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted by a particular classification." Id.
at 721.
17. Constitutional analysis is appropriate when the state is a party since the Fourteenth
Amendment applies only to state action. Programs enacted by private enterprises would be
challenged under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
18. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
19. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
20. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
21. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
22. 438 U.S. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
23. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
24. Id. at 275.
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equal protection violation.25
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, White, and Marshall would have up-
held the plan as constitutional despite the university's lack of prior delib-
erate discrimination. They applied the much less demanding
intermediate scrutiny.26 Under this approach a racial classification used
for remedial or "benign" purposes must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.2 7
Powell alone found the program unconstitutional. He argued that
any racial or ethnic classification, regardless of the class at issue, must be
subjected to strict scrutiny.28 The scheme would be upheld only if its
objective was "permissible and substantial" and the use of classification
was necessary to accomplish that objective.29 Justice Powell rejected the
notion that affirmative action could be used to redress broad societal dis-
crimination, but could be used only where "judicial, legislative, or ad-
ministrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations existed."30
Powell then found that the need to obtain the educational benefits that
flow from an ethnically diverse student body was a constitutionally per-
missible goal.31 This goal may not be achieved constitutionally by a rigid
quota, but could be pursued by considering minority status as one factor
in the admissions process.32 The plurality found the interest in a diverse
student body sufficiently compelling to allow race to be considered as a
"plus" in the admissions process.33
The views expressed in Bakke, Powell's strict scrutiny approach and
the dissent's less demanding intermediate analysis, establish the debate
that still rages over the appropriate level of scrutiny with which to ana-
lyze race-based programs. In recognizing, at the least, that race could be
"a factor" in the admissions process, Powell's opinion rejected the rigid
"color-blind constitution" approach that some justices later would sup-
port.3 ' The Bakke decision, however, also made clear that broad societal
discrimination will not support affirmative action remedies.35 Much
more explicit findings of past discrimination by the actual governmental
25. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist analyzed the case
from this approach. Id. at 408.
26. 438 U.S. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring and
dissenting).
27. Id (citations omitted).
28. Id. at 291 (plurality opinion).
29. Id at 305 (citations omitted).
30. Id at 307-08.
31. Id at 316-17.
32. Id at 317.
33. Id at 317-18.
34. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
35. 438 U.S. at 307-08.
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unit are now required.36
All of the justices agree that a race-based remedy may be used to
make the actual victims of prior illegal discrimination whole.3 7 Further,
the Court has affirmed remedial racial classifications for prior discrimina-
tion by the governmental unit involved even though the programs went
beyond compensating individuals denied jobs or other opportunities.38
The Court, however, refuses to allow affirmative action in response to a
general finding of societal discrimination. Affirmative action may not
serve as a remedy for the "effects of societal discrimination.
39
B. Fullilove v. Klutznick
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,4 the Court, in a 6-3 decision, upheld Con-
gress' ten percent minority set-aside program embodied in The Public
Works Employment Act of 1977.41 The plurality opinion, authored by
Chief Justice Burger and joined by Justices White and Powell, gave great
deference to congressional findings of past discrimination in the con-
struction industry.
[Me... approach our task with appropriate deference to Con-
gress, a co-equal branch charged by the Constitution with the
power to 'provide for the... general Welfare of the United States'
and 'to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the equal protection
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Art. I, sec 8, cl.1;
Amdt. 14, see 5.42
While upholding the set-aside, the plurality failed to state the re-
quired standard of constitutional review.43
The Court found that Congress had evidence of a long history of
marked disparity in the percentage of public contracts awarded to minor-
ity business enterprises.' The Court also found that Congress acted to
cease perpetuation of the effects of prior discrimination which had im-
paired or foreclosed access by minority businesses to public contracting
businesses, and that this congressional motive justified the creation of the
Minority Business Enterprise (MBE) provision.45
36. Id.
37. Choper, Continued Uncertainty as to the Constitutionality of Remedial Racial Classifi-
cations: Identifying the Pieces of the Puzzle, 72 IowA L. Rav. 255, 263 (1987).
38. Id
39. University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 207, 308 (1978); Wygant v. Jackson Board
of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co, 109 S. Ct. 706,
728 (1989).
40. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
41. Id at 492 (plurality opinion). The Plan defined a Minority Business as one owned by
at least fifty percent minority group members. Id at 454.
42. Id at 472.
43. Id at 491-92.
44. Id at 478.
45. Id at 473.
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In assessing the burden imposed by the set-aside on innocent firms
not guilty of prior discrimination, the Court found that an "incidental
consequence" of denying contracts to nonminorities is permissible.
46
Considering the effects of prior discrimination, the Court reasoned that
"it was within congressional power to act on the assumption that in the
past some nonminority businesses may have reaped competitive benefit
over the years from the virtual exclusion of minority firms from these
contracting opportunities."' Although the Court has recognized histor-
ical disadvantage to minorities and consequential advantages accruing to
nonminorities, it has refused to hold such factors as a sufficient govern-
ment interest to implement remedial programs. The relevance of any
benefits that nonminorities may have previously received in analyzing af-
firmative action plans may be limited to cases when Congress has acted.
As a threshold matter, the Court specifically "reject[ed] the conten-
tion that in the remedial context Congress must act in a wholly 'color-
blind' fashion. 48 The Court's reliance on congressional findings of past
discrimination in the construction industry stands in stark contrast to
Croson, where these findings could not be relied on to justify a state pro-
gram. Fulilove, however, indicates that when dealing with broad reme-
dial powers of Congress, the Court will give deference to congressional
findings and not require a high showing of past discrimination to justify
implementing affirmative action.4 9
Justices Powell, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun all adhere to the
standards they applied in Bakke, and all concur in the Fullilove judg-
ment. Powell advocates the application of strict scrutiny, while Mar-
shall, Brennan and Blackmun assert that the application of strict scrutiny
is "inapposite to racial classifications that provide benefits to minorities
for the purpose of remedying the present effects of past racial discrimina-
tion. Such classifications may disadvantage some whites, but whites as a
class lack the 'traditional indicia of suspetness ..... ,' Such programs,
therefore, should not be subject to conventional strict scrutiny which is
"strict in theory, but fatal in fact.""1
46. Id at 484.
47. Id at 485.
48. Id. at 482.
49. Id at 472-73.
50. Id at 518 (Marshall, I., concurring) (citations omitted). "[W]hites as a class [do not]
have any of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such disabili-
ties, or subject to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process." University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357 (1978) (Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting) (quoting San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)).
51. I. at 519 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 362) (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Black-
mun, JJ., concurring and dissenting).
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In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehn-
quist, states the traditional argument against racial classifications: "'Our
Constitution is color-blind ... .."2 They concede only that Congress
has the power to remedy its own racial discrimination, but maintain
there was no showing here of such illegal discrimination."
In his separate dissent, Justice Stevens argues that the minority set-
aside was not a narrowly tailored remedial measure because it provided
benefits to classes without showing that these classes had been wrong-
fully excluded from competing in the past.54
C. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education
Six years after Fullilove, the Court invalidated an affirmative action
program giving preference to minorities in firing decisions. In Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education,55 a five-to-four Court found a layoff plan
embodied in the collective bargaining agreement between a school board
and teachers' union unconstitutional.56 The plan provided that if layoffs
became necessary, those with most seniority would be retained. The plan
further provided that at no time would there be a greater percentage of
minority personnel laid off than the current percentage of minority per-
sonnel employed at the time of the layoff. Subsequently, layoffs became
necessary and the school board's adherence to the agreement called for
the firing of tenured nonminority teachers and retention of minority
teachers with less seniority. 7 The teacher's union filed suit to enjoin the
school board from adhering to the plan.
Again, there was no majority decision. Justice Powell wrote for the
plurality which included Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Rehnquist
and O'Connor. They found the layoff provision violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.58 "Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are. inher-
ently suspect and thus call for most exacting judicial examination."59
The Court rejected the approach that only the specific victims of discrim-
ination be permitted to displace whites. 6 Instead the Court applied the
strict scrutiny standard to the layoff provision. Thus, this provision was
required to promote a compelling governmental interest by a means nar-
rowly tailored to achieve that interest.61
52. Id at 522 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559
(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
53. Id at 528.
54. Id at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
56. Id at 284 (plurality opinion).
57. Id at 271.
58. Id at 284.
59. Id at 273 (quoting University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978)).
60. I.d at 277.
61. Id at 274 (citations omitted).
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Justice Powell rejected the two purposes for the preferences ad-
vanced by the school board as insufficient to establish a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.' First, the board argued the layoff protection plan
preserved minority teachers who were "role models" for minority stu-
dents. Second, the plan alleviated the effects of "societal discrimina-
tion."63 The school board proposed a forward-looking approach" by
advancing the presence of minority teachers as "role models." Thus, mi-
nority preferences were not implemented exclusively to remedy past in-
stances of illegal discrimination. The school board's strategy was to
apply the role model theory. This theory suggests that increasing the
percentage of minority teachers would lead to positive future results for
the students."5 The role model theory is not a backward-looking ap-
proach that justifies present classifications for past injustices.
As in Bakke, the Court required convincing evidence that remedial
action was warranted. Here the Court found no deliberate discrimina-
tion in hiring. Echoing the Bakke decision, a general claim of societal
discrimination alone is not enough to justify the remedial action at issue
in Wygant 6  The Court has insisted upon a showing of prior discrimina-
tion by the governmental unit involved before allowing use of remedial
racial classifications.67 Also, the role model theory has "no stopping
point" because it allows discrimination long past the point required by
any legitimate remedial purpose. 8
Turning to the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, the Wygant
Court concluded that the school board's means were not narrowly
framed to accomplish the proposed objective.6 9 The burden on innocent
teachers denied their jobs was held to be far too great. The Court distin-
guished goals implemented in hiring decisions from those taking effect
through layoffs.
In cases involving valid hiring goals, the burden to be borne
by innocent individuals is diffused to a considerable extent among
society generally. Though hiring goals may burden some innocent
individuals, they simply do not impose the same kind of injury that
layoffs impose. Denial of a future employment opportunity is not
as intrusive as loss of an existing job.'
62. Id at 274, 278.
63. Id. at 274.
64. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARv. L.
REv. 78, 87 (1986).
65. Id. at 87.
66. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (plurality opinion).
67. Id.
68. Id at 275.
69. Id. at 283.
70. Id at 282-83.
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Once hired, the teachers had certain expectations. Their seniority
was a valuable capital asset that was disrupted by the layoff plan. Gen-
eral hiring goals, on the other hand, do not have such a broad impact.71
Thus, the Court considered the burden on particular individuals too in-
trusive and found the means not narrowly tailored. Furthermore, the
Court suggested that adoption of hiring goals and other less intrusive
means were available to accomplish the school board's goals. 72 Although
the plurality emphasized unwillingness to allow race to deny one a job
already obtained, the Croson decision extends this unwillingness into hir-
ing goals as well.73
The Wygant plurality is willing to take race into account in order to
remedy prior discrimination. As a result, the Court notes that these pro-
grams may call upon innocent parties to bear some of the burden of the
remedy.74 It is interesting that Justice Rehnquist joins the Wygant plu-
rality because the reasoning is contrary to the Fullilove dissent in which
he advocated the "colorblind Constitution.
'7
In Wygant, Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring opinion in which
she agreed that strict scrutiny should be applied to programs that favor
minorities. Wygant was her first affirmative action case focusing on con-
stitutional grounds, and Justice O'Connor expressed optimism about the
disagreements expressed in prior Supreme Court decisions addressing af-
firmative action. "In the final analysis, the diverse formulations and the
number of separate writings put forth by various Members of the Court
in these difficult cases do not necessarily reflect an intractable fragmenta-
tion in opinion with respect to certain core principles."' 76 Remedying
past or present racial discrimination is a sufficiently weighty state interest
to warrant remedial use of affirmative action programs. This remedial
purpose need not be accompanied by contemporaneous findings of actual
discrimination to be accepted as legitimate as long as the public actor has
a firm basis for believing that remedial action is required.77
The layoff provision in Wygant was not narrowly tailored because it
was based on a hiring goal unrelated to remedying discrimination.78 The
hiring goal was tied to the percentage of qualified minority students in
the school district, not to the percentage of qualified minority teachers in
the relevant labor pool. Thus the goal used was not probative of discrim-
ination. Only when the availability of minority teachers substantially ex-
71. Id. at 283 (citations omitted).
72. IM at 283-84.
73. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct 706, 723-24 (1989).
74. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 281 (plurality opinion).
75. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522 (1980) (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
76. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
77. I at 291.
78. Id. at 294.
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ceeded those hired would an inference of discrimination be proper.79
Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun in
his dissenting opinion. They asserted that the public employer, with full
agreement of its employees, should be permitted to preserve the benefits
of a legitimate and constitutional affirmative-action hiring plan. Unlike
Justice O'Connor, the dissenters expressed pessimism about the Court's
affirmative action jurisprudence. "Agreement upon a means for applying
the Equal Protection Clause to an affirmative-action program has eluded
this Court every time the issue has come before us.""0
The dissenters would apply the same near strict scrutiny test where
remedial use of race is permitted "if it serves 'important governmental
objectives' and is 'substantially related to achievement of those objec-
tives.' This standard is genuinely a 'strict and searching' judicial inquiry,
but is 'not "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact."' "81 Marshall deter-
mined that regardless of which test applied, near strict scrutiny or strict
scrutiny, the plan in Wygant would be constitutional.8 2 Explicit Board
admission of or judicial determination of culpability would only have ex-
posed the Board to further litigation and liability, contributing nothing
toward the goal of integrating schools.8 3 The dissenters' concern with
the future goal of integration reflects a forward-looking rationale for re-
medial programs, even though they are willing to frame the question of
affirmative action in terms of past discrimination.
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens found it unnecessary to inquire
into specific instances of past discrimination. Stevens found that the
school had a legitimate interest in employing more black teachers for the
future. "Rather than... asking whether minority teachers have some
sort of special entitlement to jobs as a remedy for sins that were commit-
ted in the past, I believe that we should first ask whether the Board's
action advances the public interest in educating children for the
future."
84
After Wygant, the positions of seven justices on affirmative action
were evidenced. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Rehnquist, White and
Powell all adhered to strict scrutiny in evaluating all racial classifica-
tions. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun advocated the interme-
diate scrutiny analysis. Justices O'Connor and Stevens did not align with
either group. O'Connor joined the plurality in Wygant, but only because
she found the layoff plan was not sufficiently tailored to meet the school
board's objectives. In her concurring opinion, she described the distinc-
79. Id
80. Id at 301 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 301-02 (quoting University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362 (1978)
(Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting)).
82. Id at 303.
83. Id at 304.
84. Id at 313 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
tion between the plurality's "compelling" interest and the dissenters'
"important" purpose "a negligible one." 5 In the end, she declined to
adopt either test.
Justice Stevens alone was willing to look to public-interest factors
and to the future effects of affirmative action without adopting a specific
test.
D. Summary of Background Cases
Considering the Bakke, Fullilove and Wygant cases, affirmative ac-
tion to bring minorities into areas from which they were previously ex-
cluded or to advance their future opportunities is not sufficient to uphold
race-conscious programs. "[T]he Court has approved affirmative action
only as precise penance for the specific sins of racism that a government,
union, or employer has committed in the past."86 The "sin" element of
affirmative action has become the first prong of the strict scrutiny analy-
sis-the requirement of a compelling government interest. To be valid, a
program must seek to remedy specific incidents of past discrimination by
the government body. This invites questions concerning what level of
discrimination is required to employ remedial efforts.
The Court's analysis effectively requires a governmental body to
confess to illegal activity before implementing a race-conscious remedy.
"To admit guilt for past discrimination is against employers' and unions'
self-interest, and indeed, may invite race discrimination lawsuits by non-
whites;.., the task of self-judgment and self-condemnation in any form
casts a chill over efforts to implement affirmative action voluntarily."87
This chill over voluntary affirmative action is a direct result of the
Court's concern with past sin. "Making sins of past discrimination the
justification for affirmative action, however, dooms affirmative action to
further challenge even while legitimating it. As a practical matter, it sub-
jects affirmative, action plans to potentially protracted litigation over the
'factual predicate' for adopting them .... ,,
88
The Court's approach has invited assertions that white workers "in-
nocent" of their employers' past discrimination should not pay for the
sins of other members of their race.89 The concern with such innocents
has been integrated into the second part of the strict scrutiny analysis.
Thus the effect on non-minorities will help determine whether the plan is
sufficiently tailored to achieve the government's stated objectives.
85. IaM at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86. Sullivan, supra note 64, at 80.
87. Id at 92.
88. Id
89. Id
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I. The Croson Decision
A. The Facts
The Richmond City Council passed the "Minority Business Utiliza-
tion Plan" to encourage contracting with minority-owned businesses.
Such a set-aside program typically requires a certain percentage of city
contracts reserved for minority businesses. Here, the Plan required
prime contractors on city-awarded contracts to subcontract at least
thirty percent of the dollar amount of the contract to one or more Minor-
ity Business Enterprises (MBEs).90 The Plan defined an MBE as "'[a]
business at least fifty-one (51) percent of which is owned and controlled
.. by minority group members.' "91 Minority group members included
"'[c]itizens of the United States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking,
Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts.' "92 The Plan declared that it
was " 'remedial'" in nature, designed to promote wider participation by
MBEs in the contracting industry.93 A waiver of the thirty percent re-
quirement was provided if the contractor could demonstrate that quali-
fied MBEs were unavailable or unwilling to participate.94
In public hearings on the Plan, a study revealed that while the gen-
eral population of Richmond was fifty percent black, only 0.67 percent of
the city's prime construction contracts had been awarded to minority
businesses from 1978-1983.15 Contractors' associations were found to
have virtually no minorities in their membership. There was, however,
no direct evidence of any racial discrimination on the part of the city or
evidence that the city's prime contractors had discriminated against mi-
nority-owned subcontractors.
Croson was awarded the prime contract on a project to install
plumbing fixtures in the city jail. He was unable to obtain any subcon-
tractor bids from MBEs, and applied for a waiver of the thirty percent
requirement. The city denied the waiver request when Croson received a
MBE bid for seven percent above the market price and subsequently de-
cided to accept new bids for the project.
96
B. The Opinions
In only her second affirmative action case using equal protection
analysis, Justice O'Connor announced the decision of the Court. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Stevens joined in Parts I, III-B
and IV. Part II was joined by Rehnquist and White, and Parts II-A and
90. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 712-13 (1989).
91. Id. at 713.
92. Id. (quoting City of Richmond Minority Business Utilization Plan).
93. Id. (quoting City of Richmond Minority Business Utilization Plan).
94. Id
95. Id. at 714.
96. Id at 715.
V were joined by Rehnquist, White and Kennedy. Justices Scalia and
Kennedy concurred in the result, while Justices Brennan, Blackmun and
Marshall characteristically dissented.
O'Connor rejected the "stark" alternatives advocated by the cit ,
and Croson.97 Croson argued that the city must limit any race-based
remedial efforts to eradicating the effects of its own prior discrimina-
tion.98 The city, relying on the Court's Fulilove decision, felt they were
entitled to broad legislative power to define and attack the effects of prior
discrimination in its local construction industry.99
Although the Richmond plan was strikingly similar to the plan up-
held in Fulilove, the Court distinguished Fullilove as a federally enacted
plan under Congress' fourteenth amendment powers.
Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has specific
constitutional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth
Amendment.... That Congress may identify and redress the ef-
fects of society-wide discrimination does not mean that, afortiori,
the States and their political subdivisions are free to decide that
such remedies are appropriate.1"0
The States must exercise power within the limitations embodied in sec-
tion 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. "[M]ere recitation of a benign or
compensatory purpose for the use of a racial classification would essen-
tially entitle the States to exercise the full power of Congress under sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and insulate any racial
classification from judicial scrutiny under section L" "'
The majority found strict scrutiny analysis appropriate because of
the danger of stigmatic harm from racial classifications. 102 Unless
strictly reserved for remedial settings, "they [race-conscious programs]
may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of
racial hostility." 103
The Court cited a second reason for applying heightened scrutiny to
the Plan-the racial composition of the city. In Richmond, blacks com-
prised approximately fifty percent of the population and five of the nine
seats on the City Council.1" In the usual case, racial preferences involve
a choice made by a dominant racial group to its own disadvantage. In
Croson, the Court notes that the preference was enacted to the advantage
97. Id at 717.
98. Id (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 717.
100. Id at 719.
101. Id
102. Id at 721.
103. Id (quoting University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (plurality
opinion)).
104. Id at 722.
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of the majority. 105
Applying the strict scrutiny test, the Court concludes there is no
compelling interest to support the classification, nor is the Plan narrowly
tailored to advance the city's interest.10 6 A compelling interest requires
more than a generalized assertion of past discrimination in the entire in-
dustry. Societal discrimination leading to the lack of opportunities for
black entrepreneurs, standing alone, cannot justify the "rigid racial
quota." 10 7 There was nothing close to a strong factual basis to show a
constitutional or statutory violation by anyone in the Richmond con-
struction industry. 0 8
Here, the city did not know the number of qualified MBEs in the
relevant market, nor what percentage of total city construction dollars
minority firms now received."w None of the evidence revealed any spe-
cific discrimination in the Richmond construction industry. The city,
therefore, failed to demonstrate a sufficiently compelling interest to sus-
tain the preference. 110
Turning to the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, the Court
stAted that the Plan's means were not narrowly tailored; a thirty percent
quota could not realistically be tied to any injury suffered by anyone.'
The city's reliance on the disparity between the number of prime con-
tracts awarded to minority firms and the minority population of Rich-
mond was erroneous. "[W]here special qualifications are necessary, the
relevant statistical pool for purposes of demonstrating discriminatory ex-
clusion must be the number of minorities qualified to undertake the par-
ticular task."
' 12
In short, a city may enact a set-aside program only after specific
findings of discrimination. In addition, all available race-neutral reme-
dies must be attempted or at least considered prior to implementing a
race-conscious remedy."13 While searching in the past for justification
for affirmative action, Justice O'Connor ironically does not look back far
enough. Her opinion does not recognize that, in fact, discrimination may
prohibit some minorities from entering the contracting market. So the
relevant statistical pool from which to determine discrimination, the per-
centage of minority firms, is already affected by discrimination. It is also
105. Id
106. Id at 727-28.
107. Id. at 724, 728.
108. Id at 724 (quoting Wygant v. Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1986)).
109. Id at 725.
110. Id at 727.
111. Id at 725.
112. Id (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 728-29. O'Connor finds that many of the barriers to minority participation in
the construction industry appear to be race-neutral. She then suggests city-financing to help
with bonding requirements or simplification of the bidding procedures to facilitate minority
representation.
interesting that O'Connor does not discuss the burdens imposed by the
plan on white contractors because in both Wygant and Fulilove this was
an important factor.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens set himself apart from the
majority opinion by basing race-conscious programs on future concerns
instead of focusing on past conduct. "I believe the Constitution requires
us to evaluate our policy decisions-including those that govern the rela-
tionships among different racial and ethnic groups-primarily by study-
ing their probable impact on the future."' 14  This statement is
reminiscent of his dissent in Wygant." 5 Unlike the majority, he says, ",
therefore, do not agree with the premise that seems to underlie today's
decision as well as the decision in Wygant that a government decision
that rests on racial classification is never permissible except as a remedy
for a past wrong.'
1 6
Stevens did agree with the result because there was no claim by the
city that the public interest would be served by the MBE provision." 7
The city's plan was therefore distinguishable from Wygant, where an in-
tegrated faculty provided obvious benefits to students. He finds that the
Plan benefits too many; firms were included that either never did busi-
ness in the city or that discriminated against other minority groups."
8
Justice Kennedy concurred and joined all but Part II of the decision
which examined existing case law." 9 His disagreement focused on
O'Connor's characterization of federal affirmative action plans. "The
process by which a law that is an equal protection violation when enacted
by a State becomes transformed to an equal protection guarantee when
enacted by Congress poses a difficult proposition for me."' 2 Kennedy
was drawn to Justice Scalia's approach which would "strike down all
preferences which are not necessary remedies to victims of unlawful dis-
crimination, [and] would serve important structural goals, as it would
eliminate the necessity for courts to pass upon each racial preference that
is enacted."'' Perhaps as one of the Court's newest members, Kennedy
demonstrated some control over his apparent desire to disregard stare
decisis by stating that "a rule of automatic invalidity for racial prefer-
114. Id at 730 (Stevens, J., concurring).
115. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 313 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). In Wygant, Justice Stevens would have upheld the lay-off plan which preferred minority
public teachers because of the public interest in educating children for the future. Here, his
emphasis on the future impact of affirmative action again appears although he finds it insuffi-
cient to support the plan. Id
116. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 730 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
117. IkL at 731.
118. Id at 732.
119. Id at 734 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120. Id
121. Id
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ences would be a significant break with our precedents .... I am not
convinced we need adopt it at this point.
'122
Kennedy favors strict scrutiny because it will "operate in a manner
generally consistent with the imperative of race neutrality, because it for-
bids the use even of narrowly drawn racial classifications except as a last
resort."' 23 He recognizes the validity of such racial classifications only
after a judicial determination that a State or its instrumentality has vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause.124
Justice Scalia adopts the rigid "[o]ur Constitution is colorblind" ap-
proach.1 25 Although he concurred in the decision, Scalia disagreed with
the Court's dicta that state and local governments may discriminate on
the basis of race in order to "'ameliorate the effects of past discrimina-
tion.' "126 Where state or local action is at issue, he finds race-conscious
programs appropriate only as a response to a social emergency rising to
the level of imminent danger to life and limb.
1 27
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, dis-
sents, finding the city of Richmond's plan indistinguishable from the plan
upheld in Fulilove.2 8 He criticized the result as "a deliberate and giant
step backward in this Court's affirmative action jurisprudence.' 29 He
also questioned the Court's second-guessing of the city's judgment in as-
sessing prior discrimination within the city's construction industry.
130
The dissenters apply the test they have advocated since Bakke:
race-conscious classifications designed to further remedial goals must
serve important governmental objectives and be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives in order to withstand constitutional scru-
tiny.131 The dissenters argue that remedying prior discrimination is a
compelling, let alone important interest. 32 The city has an additional
"compelling interest" in preventing spending decisions from perpetuating
exclusionary effects of past discrimination. 33 The dissenters conclude
that under either the majority's strict scrutiny or their less strict
approach, Richmond has produced enough evidence of prior discrimina-




125. Id at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring).
126. Id (quoting id at 712).
127. Id
128. Id at 739 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129. Id at 740.
130. Id
131. Id. at 743 (quoting University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (Bren-
nan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring and dissenting)).
132. Id
133. Id at 744.
Summer 1990] CITY OF RICHMOND V. CROSON 715
discrimination." '134
The dissent also argues that the Plan is substantially related to legiti-
mate city interests. There is no interference with any vested right of a
contractor; nor upsetting of expectations of innocent parties. The thirty
percent "target" results in a small impact, affecting only three percent of
overall city contracting.135 The city council reasonably relied on Fulli-
love in adopting a set-aside percentage halfway between the present per-
centage of Richmond-based minority contractors and the percentage of
minorities in Richmond.136
Justice Marshall's bitterness at the majority's decision is evident in
the following passage: "[R]acial classifications drawn for the purpose of
remedying the effects of discrimination that itself was race-based have a
highly pertinent basis: the tragic and indelible fact that discrimination
against blacks and other racial minorities in this Nation has pervaded
our Nation's history and continues to scar our society." '137 By using the
same strict scrutiny standard here as the Court applied to the most
"brute and repugnant forms of state-sponsored racism, a majority of this
Court signals that it regards racial discrimination largely a phenomenon
of the past, and that government bodies need no longer preoccupy them-
selves with rectifying racial injustice."13
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, wrote a separate dis-
sent emphasizing the voluntary nature of the Plan enacted to increase
minority participation in business and remedy effects of prior discrimina-
tion. "[T]his Court, the supposed bastion of equality, strikes down Rich-
mond's efforts as though discrimination had never existed. ... So the
Court today regresses." 139 When local governments voluntarily put into
place their own affirmative action programs, should there not be a pre-
sumption of validity, that they are addressing known and important in-
stances of prior discrimination?
M. Current Justices' Views on Affirmative Action
The Croson decision, while recognizing the legitimacy of affirmative
action in general, made the burden of proving the constitutionality of
such plans difficult if not insurmountable. The result of adopting strict
scrutiny as the standard of review can be attributed largely to the chang-
ing composition of the Court and the new conservative majority that has
emerged.
134. Id at 746.
135. d at 751.
136. Id
137. Id at 752.
138. Id
139. Id at 757 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The next section will evaluate each Justice's approach to affirmative
action, where they have stood in previous decisions, and how closely they
have adhered to their view of the purpose and effectiveness of such reme-
dial classifications. Although the members of the Court are not divided
along any bright line, it is useful to evaluate their approach in terms of
two methods of analysis. First, whether they adhere to the rigid "Consti-
tution is color-blind" maxim and thus reject most plans. Second,
whether they are more closely aligned with Justice Blackmun's words in
the Bakke decision, "To get beyond race.., we must first take account
of race.., and treat them differently." 140 The principle that legal classi-
fications must be color-blind does have many virtues: it is easy to imple-
ment, it rests entirely on the moral proposition that it is wrong to draw
distinctions based on race, and it assures prohibition of racial classifica-
tions that disadvantage oppressed racial minorities.
141
A. Justice Scalia
Of all the justices, Justice Scalia adheres closest to the principle that
the constitution is color-blind. He stops short of that absolute assertion,
however, by recognizing the legitimacy of only two narrowly drawn
color-conscious practices. Race-based measures are appropriate only
when necessary to protect life and limb or to compensate actual victims
of discrimination.142
For all its virtues, the color-blind principle is too blunt, and there-
fore, in spite of his obvious attraction to this model, Justice Scalia feels
compelled to admit that the scope of constitutional equality extends be-
yond it.' 43 Further, although the liberal wing of the Court may even
agree with the utopian idea of a "color-blind Constitution," they recog-
nize that race-conscious measures must be taken now to reverse the years
of indifference and active resistance to equality that has pervaded this
nation. 44
B. Chief Justice Rehnquist
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice Stewart's dissent in Fullilove
which emphasized a view, similar to Scalia's, of a "color-blind Constitu-
tion." The Chief Justice argues that all racial discriminations are invalid
except to remedy the actual effects of a prior legal violation against a
140. University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring
and dissenting).
141. Rosenfield, Decoding Richmond. Affirmative Action and the Elusive meaning of Con-
stitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1755 (1989).
142. See id
143. Id
144. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson, Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 757 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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racial or ethnic group. 145 In Wygant, however, Rehnquist joined Pow-
ell's plurality which acknowledged that remedying past discrimination
requires taking race into account. "It is doubtful that Rehnquist sub-
scribes to all the language in Powell's Wygant decision. It is more likely
that he joined the opinion because he agreed with the result." 1" This
apparent disparity could be the result of the Chief Justice's willingness to
forego some idealogy in order to gather a majority on issues that he fa-
vors. He is now widely regarded as a consensus builder within the Court,
forming majority opinions to advance the policies of the administra-
tion. 47 In Croson, Rehnquist finally achieved a majority to apply strict
scrutiny to race-conscious remedial plans.
C. Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy's prior decisions and confirmation testimony
demonstrate that he is a genuine advocate of judicial restraint. 4 ' While
on the Ninth Circuit he did not decide any affirmative action cases under
the Equal Protection Clause. His opinions on gender discrimination and
civil rights, however, are illustrative. They reveal a deference to institu-
tions and a reluctance to employ the courts as an instrument to correct
damaging institutional policies.149 Justice Kennedy authored-the deci-
sion that rendered a lethal blow to the "comparative worth" theory,
which posits that employees in job classifications occupied primarily by
women should be paid the same as employees in job classifications filled
primarily by men, if the jobs are of equal value. Kennedy wrote that
Title VII did not require equal pay for women performing jobs that,
while not identical, were of "comparative worth" to higher paying job
categories dominated by men. 150
In Croson, Kennedy rejected automatic invalidity of racial prefer-
ences only because he was confident that "strict scrutiny will operate in a
manner generally consistent with the imperative of race neutrality, be-
cause it forbids the use even of narrowly drawn racial classifications ex-
cept as a last resort."'15 He rejects race-conscious remedies except after
145. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522-28 (1980) (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
146. Choper, Continued Uncertainty as to the Constitutionality of Remedial Racial Classifl-
cations: Identifying the Pieces of the Puzzle, 72 IowA L. RFv. 255, 261 (1987).
147. Coyle, Court Blazes a New Trail, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 21, 1989, at 54, col. 1: 'Two terms
ago.... Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared to have abandoned his position as the lone ranger of
dissent to forge some unusual coalitions within his divided court."
148. Bell, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy: Will His Appointment to the United States Supreme
Court Have an Impact on Employment Discrimination? 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1037, 1064 (1988).
149. Id at 1052.
150. Id at 1045. The decision was AFSCME v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir.
1985).
151. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 734 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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judicial determination that a state or governmental unit has discrimi-
nated.1 52 This race-neutral approach and reliance on specific constitu-
tional violations to support affirmative action places Kennedy squarely
among the most conservative justices of the Court. Kennedy, Rehnquist,
and Scalia present a formidable core of opposition to creators of affirma-
tive action programs that the Court will find constitutional.
D. Justice O'Connor
During her confirmation hearings, Justice O'Connor was widely
thought to be a moderate justice.153 She was described as a swing vote, a
centrist who stood between the Court's badly divided liberal and con-
servative wings. Newspapers frequently labeled her "'moderate'"...
sometimes compared to retired Justice Powell."' 154 The reality is that,
with a few notable exceptions, O'Connor is most comfortably linked with
the conservative views of her Arizona colleague Chief Justice Rehnquist.
In her years on the Court, she has voted with Rehnquist eighty to ninety
percent of the time.1 55
After Wygant, O'Connor's position on affirmative action was clear.
She joined Powell's opinion, finding the plan unconstitutional, but wrote
separately emphasizing that the plan was not narrowly tailored. 56 In
Croson, she specifically adopted Powell's approach requiring specific inci-
dences of discrimination to support affirmative action programs and a
narrowly tailored means keyed to the relevant labor pool.1 7 Her failure
to address the burden on non-minority contractors in Croson may signal
that the effect on "innocents" is no longer a significant factor in the
Court's affirmative action analysis.
E. Justice White
Since Bakke, it is a fair assumption that Justice White has stiffened
his criteria for upholding remedial racial classifications. White joined
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun in dissent in the Bakke deci-
sion. He then subscribed to Chief Justice Burger's stricter standard in
Fullilove. White found the plan in Wygant unconstitutional, but failed to
state a standard of review. By joining the Croson majority, he has indi-
cated his approval of strict scrutiny for all race-conscious programs.
152. Ia
153. Coyle, Court Blazes a New Trail, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 21, 1989, at 52, col. 1. Professor
Marshall, of Northwestern University, has said, "O'Connor is a moderating force and she is
terribly important in that respect." Id
154. Cheh, O'Connor's "Moderate" Image Springs from Liberals' Wishing Well, MANHAT-
TAN LAWYER, Aug. 14, 1989, at 12, col. 1.
155. Id.
156. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 293-94 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment). See also supra text accompanying notes 61-64.
157. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 723 (1989).
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F. Justice Stevens
Justice Stevens joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in Bakke and dis-
sented in Fulilove, finding the plan unconstitutional."'8 He then dis-
sented in Wygant, for the first time approving an affirmative action
program. The Wygant dissent was the surprise, applying neither a strict
scrutiny nor a "near strict scrutiny" test. Stevens asked instead if the
purpose of having an integrated faculty served a "rational" or "valid" or
"legitimate" public purpose.1 9
Steven's approach is quite deferential; transcending consideration of
the harm to a disadvantaged group. This is a very unusual position, bas-
ing the validity of affirmative action not onpast discrimination but on the
needs of the future. "Justice Stevens stood alone in even suggesting...
in Wygant that school boards are entitled to conclude that taking affirma-
tive steps to get and keep black teachers on their faculties will provide
'obvious' educational benefits .... ,, "6  Although he will find programs
invalid if the public interest is insufficient to necessitate inclusion of mi-
nority groups with racial preferences, Stevens' approach is almost re-
freshing in light of the majority's concern with specific factual findings of
prior illegal acts.
16 '
G. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun can effectively be
grouped together as they consistently employ the same standard in af-
firmative action cases. They require that the plan serve important gov-
ernment interests and be substantially related to achieving that
interest.162 In Croson it is interesting that while criticizing the majority's
use of strict scrutiny, they demonstrate nonetheless that the Richmond
plan satisfies the requirements of the strict scrutiny test as well. 63
Affirmative action may become another area where the more liberal
wing of the Court continues to disagree with majority holdings and pro-
mote their own views through dissenting opinions. While the propriety
of this type of jurisprudence is open to argument, it is true that this area
of constitutional law is still in a state of flux, and the Court will be for-
mulating standards based on the cases brought to them. For the time
158. See infra text accompanying notes 25 and 52.
159. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. at 314-316 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
160. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 78, 98 (1986).
161. See Note, Justice Stevens' Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1146
(1987). "Since his elevation to the Supreme Court in 1975 .... Justice Stevens has rejected the
traditional multitiered method and has articulated a separate vision of equal protection." Id at
1146.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 26-27, 50-51, 81-83.
163. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 743, 751 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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being, Brennan, Blackmun and Marshall find their influence on the
Court to be almost exclusively in the dissent rather than in the majority.
They have been in this role before,
often joining forces in the past decade to criticize the court's con-
servative drift. But always, in years past, they have bucked the
trend and have been able to pick up a fifth vote to eke out a
number of major victories in civil rights and liberties cases. Now,
however, as the Court's new five member conservative majority
continues to solidify, victories for the liberals are rare."'
The importance of dissent, however, has not been overlooked. The
disagreement over affirmative action forces the majority to reconsider the
result and address the dissent's arguments. As Professor Lawrence Tribe
has said, "'[T]here is a "generation-skipping" flavor to current dissents.
Brennan and Marshall are speaking in their dissents to a more distant
future.' "165
IV. Enacting Constitutional Affirmative Action
Plans after Croson
Part V of O'Connor's Croson opinion, in which three other justices
join, gives specific guidance to cities seeking to enact constitutionally
valid programs. 166 First, there must be specific evidence of discrimina-
tion excluding minorities from the industry.1 67 Second, a statistical dis-
parity must exist between the number of qualified minorities and the
actual number hired. 168 Third, evidence of particular instances of denial
of public contracts or subcontracts would lend support to a claim that
broad relief is needed.169 Fourth, a city should provide evidence that
local governments' contracting rules, such as bonding or credit require-
ments, have a disproportionate negative impact on MBEs and that alter-
native safeguards without harmful side effects could ensure contractor
responsibility. Finally, race-neutral methods must have been considered
and found ineffective. Evidence of discrimination against MBEs, by
bonding companies or banks providing financing, also would be quite
important. 170
By requiring such exhaustive findings, the Court seems to expect
governments to act as a court or commission in gathering and weighing
evidence, creating a record, and considering alternative means. This ap-
164. Wermiel, Four Justices Seem Prepared to Assent to a Full-Time Role Focusing on Dis-
sent, Wall St. J., February 19, 1990, at B4, col. 2.
165. Id.




170. Dobrovir, Creating a Program that Passes the Croson Test, Legal Times, May 1, 1989,
at 32, col. 2.
proach has been criticized as inconsistent with the Court's usual com-
mands. "Usually the complaint is that the courts are acting too much
like legislatures and city councils; here the Supreme Court insisted that
the Richmond City Council act MORE like a judicial body." '17 1 The
prominent opponents of affimative action are always prepared to entrust
to the wisdom of state and local governments policy questions from abor-
tion to welfare. 172 Apparently, affirmative action is an exception where
instead the Court will have the final word. 173
State laws that discriminate against minorities will be found uncon-
stitutional except in the most extreme cases. No measure which explic-
itly discriminates against a racial group has been upheld since the
infamous Korematsu v. United States,74 cited in Croson. Affirmative ac-
tion will most likely be judged less strictly. Programs will be upheld if
narrowly tailored to remedy the effects of prior discrimination. This is a
more lenient standard than the essentially automatic invalidity that ap-
plies to race-conscious measures injuring minorities. 75
Perhaps these differing standards recognize a fundamental distinc-
tion between discrimination for and against minorities. This distinction
suggests that the ideal of a "color-blind Constitution" is no justification
for subjecting race-conscious remedies to an exacting standard that effec-
tively reduces the incentive for employers to voluntarily seek increased
minority participation.
A. Congressional Cure?
The Croson decision did not signal the demise of affirmative action
programs. "Rather, the fate of affirmative action has been determined in
the way such matters should be settled-by the actions of countless indi-
viduals and institutions.... In the United States, affirmative action is an
institutional reality." 176 Instead of trusting the future of affirmative ac-
tion to institutions, Congress has introduced legislation to give states
more deference in enacting voluntary programs.
17 7
171. Strauss, Leaving the Door Open for Affinnative Action, Legal Times, May 1, 1989, at
29, col. 1.
172. Id.
173. See id at 30, col. 1.
174. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). "The reference to Korematsu clearly expresses the depth of the
Croson majority's discomfort with the ever-expanding use of race as a criterion for distributing
public resources and opportunities." Cooper, A Slow Return to Constitutional Colorblindness,
Legal Times, May 1, 1989, at 27, col. 2.
175. Strauss, supra note 171, at 30, col. 1.
176. Id at 29, col. 1.
177. Allen, Time to Fight for Civil Rights, National Bar Exchange, October, 1989, at 5.
Representative Tom Campbell has introduced the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1989, which
would specify that certain groups defined by race be protected by the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
that members of protected groups be entitled to representation or benefits in proportion to
their numbers, and that numerical disproportion is prima facie proof of discrimination. Id
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V. Conclusion
Perhaps it is too late to hope that the Court will reconsider the stan-
dard announced in Croson to determine the validity of voluntary affirma-
tive action programs. The new conservative majority that has emerged
made the strict scrutiny test almost inevitable after the years of plurality
opinions advancing that approach. State and local governments, how-
ever, should not interpret Croson as undermining their responsibilities
to promote equality through minority hiring programs. Affirmative ac-
tion will be upheld when supported by the requisite evidence of prior
discrimination or of exclusion from the field. Nonetheless, Justice Mar-
shall's description of Croson rings true, "Today's decision marks a delib-




A. Metro Broadcasting v. FCC
In the summer of 1990,-the Supreme Court announced its decision
in the closely watched case of Metro Broadcasting v. FCC.179 'This case
presented the Court with an opportunity to apply the Croson standard to
affirmative action programs enacted by Congress and thereby effectively
overrule Fulliove. The Court, however, did not apply strict scrutiny,
and in an opinion delivered by Justice Brennan, upheld the constitution-
ality of two federal affirmative action programs. He was joined by Jus-
tices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens.
The cases concern policies enacted by the Federal Communications
Commission to increase minority ownership of broadcast outlets. The
majority opinion held that race-conscious measures mandated by Con-
gress will be evaluated under the less demanding "near strict scrutiny"
test. The plans enacted by the FCC were found to "serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and [to be] substantially related to achievement of
those objectives."' 180 Justice Brennan noted that the standard set forth in
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. did not prescribe the level of scru-
tiny applied to a racial classification employed by Congress.' 8 ' Justice
Kennedy dissented, joined by Justice Scalia. Justice O'Connor also dis-
sented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. Both
dissents argued for the adoption of strict scrutiny analysis.
178. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 740 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
179. 58 U.S.LW. 5053 (June 26, 1990).
180. Id at 5058.
181. d at 5057.
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B. Justice Brennan's Resignation
After forging a majority in the Metro Broadcasting case to uphold
two federal affirmative action programs, Justice Brennan surprised the
nation by submitting his letter of resignation from the Supreme Court on
July 20, 1990. His resignation surely represents a dramatic turning point
for the Court. With over three decades of service on the Supreme Court,
Brennan was widely regarded as the Court's leading liberal and great
defender of civil rights.1 12 Although conservatives now dominate the
Court and Justice Brennan most recently found his role as a dissenter,
the Metro Broadcasting decision is just one example of how his vote has
made the difference in the few recent liberal victories.
Justice Brennan's departure gives President Bush his first opportu-
nity to appoint a Supreme Court justice and solidify the conservative ma-
jority. Bush's decision to name Judge David Souter has created much
political controversy largely due to the paucity of prior decisions and
writings from which to glean some idea of Souter's judicial philosophy.
The debate has focused primarily on the abortion issue and the proper
role of the Senate Judiciary Committee in questioning Judge Souter. The
mystery surrounding Souter and his views on reproductive rights hope-
fully will not obscure the importance of his position on other civil rights
issues like affirmative action. It seems likely that President Bush's choice
will support the administration's stance against affirmative action. De-
spite this gloomy outlook, the civil rights bill now moving through the
Senate will help to validate the legality of affirmative action programs.
Nevertheless, the Court and the nation will never be the same without
Justice Brennan keeping watch on our civil rights.
Considering the Court's conservative stronghold, Justice Brennan's
departure .will further cement the holding in Croson that state and local
affirmative action plans must pass the strictest scrutiny.
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